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Public relations is a developing profession in search of differentiating and 
defining itself from other fields of study. Like all industries, the field of public relations 
isn’t immune to crisis and professionals find themselves engaging in crisis 
communication as a solution to their problems. The number of crises incidents and their 
severity is rising along with the growing complexity of technology and society (Bailey, 
Malone, & Stephens, 2005). An organization’s choice of message strategy affects both 
how people perceive the crisis and the image of the organization experiencing the crisis. 
Crisis communication is more typically associated with public relations and the need for 
organizations to repair damaged reputation after a crisis or disaster (Benoit, 1995; 
Coombs, 1999). Additionally, public relations is viewed as most valuable after a crisis 
situation in which key messages are constructed and communicated to stakeholders 
(Ihlen, 2010). As a result, organizations within a multitude of industries look to public 
relations strategies to manage a crisis. Crisis communication research seeks to address the 
impact of crisis on the practice with the aid of theory, models and existing literature. 
The translation of crisis communications in the realm of the nuclear industry has 
been minimally explored in the past years. According to statistics published by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (as cited by Ansolabehere & Konisky, 2009), with a 
40 percent increase in demand for electricity over the next 30 years expansion of electric 
power generation over the coming decades, nuclear power presents a major political 2 
 
 
challenge for the United States as a several nuclear plants begin the license renewal 
process and there is still a vast majority of public uneducated about nuclear power.  This 
suggests that there will need to be continual evaluation of communication to publics with 
the possibility of construction of 10 new nuclear power facilities (Ansolabehere & 
Konisky, 2009). With the recent progress towards revitalizing the nuclear industry and 
the continued growth of technology, industry and population, exploring crisis 
communications through research has become an increasing need.  
Since the inception of the nuclear industry, publics have attached a variety of 
attributions and meanings that have polarized public opinion on a global scale. According 
to Kidd (2010), it can also be pointed out that some issues, clearly negative for the 
industry, have arguably increased in significance over the past decade.  For many publics, 
the perception of nuclear energy resonates with undertones of Hiroshima, Chernobyl, 
‘Atoms for Peace,’ and Three Mile Island and as a result, proponents and opponents alike 
have created both positive and negative reasons for exploring new nuclear sites (Tilson, 
1996). Additionally, with the electricity market restructuring and liberalization in the mid 
to late 1990s, publics viewed the growth of nuclear power soon to be obsolete especially 
with few new reactors actively under construction with most of them being delayed due 
to a variety of political issues. 
According to Kidd (2010), about a decade ago, nuclear was regarded as an 
uneconomical option for generating large quantities of electricity and was plagued with 
issues of safety and weapons proliferation causing proposals for nuclear plant 
construction to be dismissed. Most recently, there has been a turnaround in the stigma 
associated with nuclear power as nuclear communicators have recognized that in depth 3 
 
 
dialogue with the general public allows them to accept concerns over safety, waste, 
weapons proliferation, despite the cost of time and money. 
Opposition to power plants is thought to be particularly pronounced because of 
facilities that emit or produce toxic waste locally such as coal, nuclear, natural gas, and 
other power plants that are complex chemical processing facilities (Ansolabehere & 
Konisky, 2009). Given the publics’ recent concern with eco-friendly practices within the 
energy industry, the nuclear industry’s public relations campaign blends advocacy with 
elements of public education programs that focus on using educational-style media (such 
as visitor centers) to promote nuclear power as environmentally friendly (Kidd, 2010).  
With the industry campaigning itself with ‘eco-nuclear’ messages and capitalizing on 
public concern for the environment, it provides a communication strategy for making 
over the image of nuclear power and the ‘greening’ of public sentiment while moving 
away from that association to nuclear disasters like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl 
(Kidd, 2010).  
As a result of industry leaders attempt to educate the public on the positive 
aspects of nuclear energy and through the development of more rigorous operational 
standards, since the Three Mile Island accident, there has been a salutary effect on the 
nuclear power industry (Taylor, 2004). With more stringent policies, procedures, 
standards and continual benchmarking within the industry, there is more trust and 
credibility attributed to industry officials and leaders. Also, the inception of organizations 
like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Energy Institute, has been a 
platform for the industry to communicate amongst itself and to other publics outside of 4 
 
 
the industry to maintain checks and balances regarding operation, issues management, 
safety and other elements of public concern.  
According to statistics published by the Nuclear Energy Institute (2011), nuclear 
energy provides 20 percent of the United States’ electricity and is the number one source 
of emission-free electricity with 104 reactors operating in 31 different states with 32 
companies licensed to operate nuclear reactors. Given these statistics, there is need to 
understand crisis communications and the exercise of media relations practices within the 
nuclear industry. Although the term crisis communication may be viewed as overused by 
communication professionals, understanding the new media landscape (that combines 
both traditional and new media tools of communication) and how nuclear communicators 
practice in this landscape relative to crisis communications should be explored. Research 
in this area is necessary as we continue to move towards new media and advancements in 
the acquisition of knowledge and information. Also, more research needs to be completed 
in the area of crisis communications as nuclear energy is being pushed to the forefront of 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Crisis can be defined as an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive 
change is impending, either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable 
outcome, or one with the distinct possibility of a highly desirable and positive outcome 
(Fink, 1986). It can also be regarded as a threat to an organization with the potential to 
escalate in intensity, fall under close government or media scrutiny that can jeopardize 
the current positive public image of an organization or interfere with normal business 
operations including damage to the bottom line in a number of ways.  
 
Relative to the nuclear industry, in 1979, the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power 
Plant had an accident leading to the near meltdown of the plant's reactor core. According 
to Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987), “the accident not only cost Metropolitan 
Edison (the utility company that owned the plant) billions of dollars but it altered the fate 
of the nuclear power industry in the United States” (p. 283). The plant owners and 
operators paid $26 million in evacuation costs, financial losses, and medical surveillance 
in comparison to the estimated cost of repairs and the production of electricity via other 
means at $4 billion (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987). Based on this example, it is 
recognized that crises do not appear in a social vacuum but should be understood as 
social phenomena represented defined and experienced in certain social and cultural 




As all crises have different contributing factors or events that lead to the problem 
researchers and theorists of crisis communications have created categories and 
dimensions to help define different crisis types.  Coombs (2004) and Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) posit three clusters, victim, accidental and intentional crisis clusters, for 
which crisis can occur.  
The victim crisis cluster contains natural disasters (acts of nature that can be 
damaging to an organization like earthquakes or weather), rumors (false and damaging 
information that is circulated within society), workplace violence (current or former 
employee injuries or attempts to injure current employees), and product 
tampering/malevolence (external agents that cause damage to an organization or its 
products) (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holiday, 2002).  
The accidental crisis cluster includes challenges (stakeholders claim an 
organization is operating in an inappropriate manner and there is a public challenge based 
on moral or ethical, not legal, grounds), technical error accidents (technology or 
equipment failure causes an industrial accident), technical error recalls (technology or 
equipment failure resulting in it being deemed harmful or a product recall occurs) 
(Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holiday).  
Lastly, the intentional crisis cluster includes human error accident (caused by 
industrial accidents resulting from a person or people not performing their job properly), 
human error recall (a product is deemed harmful to stakeholders and as a result the 
product is recalled from a person or people not performing a job properly), and 
organizational misdeed (laws or regulations are knowingly violated by management or a 7 
 
 
product or service that will injure or place stakeholders at risk is offered) (Coombs, 2004; 
Coombs & Holiday, 2002). 
 
Although there are a variety of crisis clusters, crisis within the nuclear industry 
may be viewed as an industrial crisis due to the highly technical processes, the large 
devastation that a crisis may cause and its associated cost. Taking an in depth look at 
industrial crisis, can help to portray the complexities of industrial crises and the extensive 
research needed for communication during a crisis event. Industrial crises are becoming 
important because of their increased frequency, the extensive damage they cause, and 
their cost to organizations and society (Miglani, Miller, Mitroff, & Shrivastava, 1988). 
Since industrial crises are situations in which organized industrial activities are the source 
of damage to human life, natural and social environments, there seems to be an attached 
logic of expectancy regarding crisis situations (Miglani, et al., 1988). Organizations are 
becoming larger in size and scope causing the impacts of industrial crises to sometimes 
transcend organizational and national boundaries to create harm on a global scale 
(Miglani, et al., 1988). 
Industrial crises do not always have their worst consequences at the point of 
occurrence as they may unfold in complex ways because the more severe effects occur 
long after the triggering event and its causes have been identified (Miglani, et al., 1988). 
Industrial crises can also be defined as both organizational and inter-organizational 
phenomena caused by human, communication, and technological failures within and 
among organizations (Miglani, et al., 1988). As a result, industrial crises have a number 
of key defining characteristics including: triggering event, large scale damage to human 8 
 
 
life and environment, large economic costs, large social costs, causes of crisis, multiple 
stakeholder involvement and conflict, responses to crisis and crisis resolution and 
extension (Miglani, et al., 1988).  
Triggering events within industrial crises are triggered by specific events 
identifiable according to place, time, and agents. Represented by sudden destructive 
events or new information about destructive aspects of existing products, processes and 
practice, these are often warnings that aren’t taken seriously due to their low probability 
of occurrence (Miglani, et al., 1988). Accordingly, triggering events initiate crisis 
processes in several domains such as product markets, financial markets, national and 
regional economies, the physical environment, medical and public health areas, 
legislative and governmental actions, and social relations (Miglani, et al., 1988). 
It is prescribed that for each critical area of vulnerability, organizations should 
identify whether there are any technological, confrontational, malevolence, or 
management failure that could trigger potential crises (Donovan, El Sawy, & Housel, 
1986). Once identified, each type of crisis should be classified by its potential severity to 
allow for top management evaluation so that resources can be allocated for crisis 
management planning (Donovan, et al., 1986).  
Large-scale damage to human life and environment is a result of the triggering 
event and the subsequent crisis leading to perceived or real damage to human life and/or 
the natural environment are mitigated by lack of information, uncertainty about 
consequences and highly subjective perceptions of risk (Miglani, et al., 1988). In 
contrast, large economic costs can be attributed to such crises, as organizations are 9 
 
 
generally held legally liable for compensating victims for the damage caused in an 
industrial crisis (Miglani, et al., 1988).  
Large social costs are significant due to the disruption in social, political and 
cultural arenas as crises are generally associated with evacuations of people, 
rehabilitation of affected persons, reorganization of family interdependencies and 
changes in social order (Miglani, et al., 1988). Additionally, conflict arises over the 
causes and consequences of the crisis creating political disruption and pressure on 
political parties and governmental agencies associated with the crisis as conflicts over 
causes and consequences of crises create political disruptions (Miglani, et al., 1988). In 
this context of industrial crisis, an individual devoted to communication with officials, 
the community, and the media would be valuable to provide the sense making capacity 
needed to collect, interpret and disseminate vital information during a crisis (Miller & 
Horsley, 2009). 
The cause of a crisis is a defining characteristic of industrial crises. Regulatory 
failures allow hazardous technologies to enter communities that are ill prepared to handle 
them.  According to Miglani, et al. (1988), physical and social infrastructure supporting 
industrial activities and specific industrial units also determines a community's capacity 
to prevent and cope with industrial crises. Preparedness failures in the form of inadequate 
emergency plans (both on and off site), lack of emergency medical capacity, and ill-
prepared civil defense authorities can lead to proliferation of harm from the triggering 
events (Miglani et al., 1988).  
Prior to Three Mile-Island, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 protected nuclear 
electric utilities from assuming the full liability for claims in the event of widespread 10 
 
 
damage produced from a nuclear plant catastrophe (Sylves, 1984). However, post three 
mile island, nuclear power plants assumed more responsibility through direction to 
submit upgraded emergency plans, prepare emergency procedures necessary to activate 
the plans and to supply evidence that the administrative and physical measures were set 
forth for alerting and instructing the public within a 10-mile emergency planning zone 
(Sylves, 1984). Accepting the inevitability of a crisis is the most difficult step an 
organization must take towards effective crisis management and therefore must include 
the “unthinkable” as an integral part of top management strategic planning (Donovan et 
al., 1986). 
Given the complexities of strategic management, it should be understood that for 
industrial crises multiple stakeholder involvement and conflict are inevitable in causing, 
communicating, and mitigating the effects of industrial crises. Additionally, the media 
play a key role in communicating crisis events to the public as they shape public 
perceptions and responses to crises. Consequently, the most profoundly affected 
stakeholders are the victims including workers in production facilities, consumers, and 
communities in which hazardous facilities are located. Relative to the public’s 
uncertainty about nuclear radiation, research has also posited that unborn children 
become victims because of genetic effects or delayed medical effects; also, remote 
observers of crisis events suffer deeply (Miglani et al., 1988).  
  One of the unique challenges of industrial crisis is the responses to crises from 
stakeholders that attempt to mitigate destruction and social disruption and prevent future 
crises of a similar kind from occurring (Miglani et al., 1988). Accordingly, immediate 
responses, made under severe pressures, inadequate and conflicting information, aim at 11 
 
 
technical damage control and rescue and relief of injured persons. Responses generally 
attract intense media scrutiny due to the emotionally charged environment (Miglani et al., 
1988). 
 Lastly, crisis resolution and crises extension allow decision-makers to attempt to 
resolve a crisis by mitigating its effects. According to Shrivastava (1987), often recovery 
from damages is viewed as the resolution of the crisis. However, little effort is taken to 
eliminate the root causes as they cannot be identified or in some cases, the emphasis is 
placed on the symptoms rather than the actual cause leaving the organization venerable to 
similar crises that could deepen or extend the problem.   
 
THE CRISIS CYCLE 
The in-depth look at industrial crisis can be viewed from the modular stages of 
crisis prescribed by a variety of scholars in crisis communications. The first stage, the 
pre-crisis stage, is emphasized and understood that being confronted with crisis is a 
natural part of an organization’s lifecycle, development and learning processes 
(Falkheimer & Heide, 2009; Sellnow & Ulmer, 2002).   
Within the realm of crisis, communication during and after is one of the most 
important factors in determining the long-term effects of a crisis (Coombs, 1999; Marra, 
1998; Perry & Taylor, 2005). According to Jacques (2007), the real identified cause of 
major crises besides communication is poor maintenance practice, human error, bad 
planning, material failure, unethical or dishonest behavior, unresponsive culture, 
leadership failure, poor judgment, or insufficient training. According to Coombs (2007), 
organizations are better able to handle crises when they (1) have a crisis management 12 
 
 
plan that is updated at least annually, (2) have a designated crisis management team, (3) 
conduct exercises to test the plans and teams at least annually, and (4) pre-draft some 
crisis messages. Given that society is technologically inclined and interconnected in 
many ways that in addition to a number of planning-prevention steps, organizations 
should consider developing a crisis manual online, updating e-mail lists and databases, 
drafting guidelines to respond quickly to web-based rumors, prepare links to be used on 
the company’s website and test the online crisis plan (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008). 
 
The second stage, the crisis response stage, is when the organization responds to 
the actual crisis focusing on three points:  (1) to be quick, (2) to be accurate, and (3) to be 
consistent (Coombs, 2007; Huang & Su, 2009; Marra, 1998). When a crisis occurs, 
organizations need to convey messages to stakeholders by engaging in instructing 
information (Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Sturges, 1994). In addition to communicating 
instructing information, crisis response communication includes conveying ongoing crisis 
events to stakeholders, decision making within the crisis management team (a unit put 
together to contain the crisis from spreading inside or outside the organization or 
managing the crisis in its current state) and the organization regarding the amount of 
information to share. Appropriate communication decisions within the response stage 
may simplify the crisis recovery stage by containing or minimizing the crisis (Dulek, 
Hale & Hale, 2005). 
 Uncertainty during a crisis revolves around questions of cause, blame, response, 
public perception, resolution, and consequences and as a result, the purpose of strategic 
communication during a crisis is to reduce uncertainty about these concerns as well as 13 
 
 
control the damage to prevent negative changes in relationships with environmental 
components and stakeholders (Sturges, 1994; Bailey, Malone, & Stephens,, 2005).  
Communicating uncertainty and ambiguity is now encouraged as a best practice when the 
causes leading to a crisis are unclear (Wester, 2009). 
 The final stage, the post-crisis response stage, looks for ways to better prepare 
for the next crisis and fulfills commitments made during the crisis phase including 
follow-up information (Coombs, 2007).  Depending upon the crisis, issues of image 
restoration or renewal may emerge in the post-crisis discourse to address the reputational 
threat posed by the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Sturges, 1994; Ulma, Seeger & 
Sellnow, 2007). Renewal is more likely when an organization has developed instrumental 
communication channels and relationships with stakeholders that can help it overcome 
the many challenges associated with crisis.  The “focus of image restoration is limited 
primarily to post-event discourse and to that communication specifically associated with 
accusations and responses” (Ulma, et al., 2007, p. 131). An organization’s previous 
actions and mission, as well as its internal and external communication and development 
of good will with stakeholders prior to the crisis, determines its potential to successfully 
engage in a rhetoric of renewal (Ulma, et al., 2007). Organizations that de-emphasize 
corporate responsibility prior to crisis will not likely be able to shed issues of corporate 
responsibility after a crisis, and in addition, they may have created public commitments 
prior to a crisis that prohibit focusing on the more positive aspects of crisis (Cameron, 
Kim & Kim, 2009; Sellnow & Ulmer, 2002).  More importantly, renewal, which consists 
of corrective action and change following a crisis, is most successful when a response to 
renew or correct the problem is communicated and followed (Ulma, et al., 2007).  14 
 
 
OTHER CRISIS MODELS 
In addition to the popular three-stage model of pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis, 
Fink (1986) introduced a four-stage crisis model. His model prescribes crisis as occurring 
in a cyclical fashion.  
The first stage, being the prodromal crisis stage or pre-crisis stage, is the warning 
stage where sometimes the crisis is evident or foreseen but no action is taken (Fink, 
1986). Similar to the three-stage model as discussed above, the prodromal crisis stage 
seeks to confront crisis before a situation occurs by planning, outlining potential crisis 
and looking for potential crisis through monitoring. In addition, pre-event planning 
including identifying risk areas and corresponding risk reduction, pre-setting initial crisis 
responses so that decision making during a crisis is more efficient and identifying 
necessary response resources are essential to this stage. Literature has shown that it is 
vital for an organization to communicate during crisis as publics do not passively receive 
and/or react to crisis information or the response provided by an organization, in contrast, 
publics actively engage in a variety of coping strategies to help themselves make sense of 
the crisis (Jin, 2009).  Additionally, media play up the drama of the event by amplifying 
the social risks, whereas emergency response information might work to provide efficacy 
cues. If there is an increased fear arousal resulting in denial, it can be noted that 
emergency management planning and communication can fail dramatically (Heath, Lee 
and Ni, 2009). 
 A contingency plan serves as a constant reminder of potential problems and 
provides checkpoints for employees to follow to prevent crisis (Seeger, 2006). The field 
of risk perception and risk communication research has provided additional knowledge of 15 
 
 
understanding how people react before and during a crisis situation (Wester, 2009). For 
example: 
“Health risks from naturally occurring background radon radiation will be 
judged (or rather reacted to) differently from radiation from radon due to 
an industrial contamination. In the first case, the risk derives from a 
natural source where no one is to blame and the exposure is unintentional, 
whereas in the second case, the risk is man-made and a result of careless 
risk management” (Wester, 2009, p. 119-120). 
 
The acute crises stage is the beginning of the crisis where there is a transition 
from planning and preventing to implementing (Fink, 1986). Also, Coombs (2002) 
suggests three distinct research streams regarding alternate approaches to the selection of 
crisis response strategies that includes: (1) corporate apologia (2) image restoration 
theory (3) situational crisis communicating theory. 
 
The chronic crisis stage or the clean up stage is the period of recovery, self-
analysis and fixing the damage. This stage could be the longest stage of a crisis and 
requires extensive planning by the crisis management to help prepare for this stage (Fink, 
1986). The impact of consistent responses remain fairly stable across three crisis forms, 
and thus, this stability can serve to deflect, reduce, and even prevent the negativity 
generated by a crisis (Coombs, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Perry & Taylor, 2005). 
And lastly, the crisis resolution stage is where the organization becomes whole again as 
the crisis has been controlled and a resolution was achieved.  
 
The three-stage model and the four-stage model all address the cycle of crisis 
through stages or phases. Although no two crises are the same, these models can be 16 
 
 
applied to a crisis situation as a tool for guidance and cause for action. In addition to 
these models, Pearson and Mitroff (1993) offer their five stage model to suggest crises 
occurs in five dimensions of which are that they are “highly visible, require immediate 
attention, contain an element of surprise, have a need for action, and are outside the 
organization’s complete control” (p. 49). The five dimensions suggested by Mitroff and 
Pearson (1993) connect to their five phases of crisis management which include: (1) 
signal detection (with the aim of doing as much as possible to prevent crises from 
occurring in the early stages); (2) preparation/prevention (by creating crisis teams as well 
as crisis training and simulation exercises); (3) containment/damage limitation; (4) 
recovery and; (5) learning (by adequately reflecting and critically examining the lessons 
learned from experiencing a crisis) (see Appendix I). 
 
STAKEHOLDER PUBLICS 
A key component within crisis communication, besides understanding the crisis 
process cycle, is understanding how an organization should communicate with its 
stakeholders as “communication can be used to influence how stakeholders interpret a 
crisis and the organization in crisis” (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 280). Stakeholder 
theory defines publics as any group that can affect or be affected by the operations of an 
organization and typical stakeholders include the media, government, employees, local 
community, suppliers, competitors, special interest groups, stockholders, consumer and 
unions (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 1995; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). Stakeholder 
theory is timely for public relations professionals that concentrate on the long-term social 
networks and relationships their organizations have at their accessibility especially during 17 
 
 
a crisis (Luoma-aho & Vos, 2009). During a crisis, organizations must determine how to 
communicate to their various stakeholders to preserve their current relationship and their 
organizational image (Malone & Stephens, 2009). Issue arenas, formed around a topic, 
incident or a shared interest, are places of stakeholder exchange, negotiating interests and 
spaces for enactment (Weick, 2001).  Subsequently, whoever perceives the issue early on 
and is able to establish sufficient credibility, may turn out to be the dominant voice on the 
issue, as others are left in the audience (Luoma-aho and Vos, 2009). Organizations should 
identify all stakeholders involved in their crisis and group them by shared characteristics 
into publics (or groups) as a crisis can expand the number of salient stakeholders (Bailey 
et al., 2005; Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000).  
According to Dougherty (1992) there are four types of publics. One, enabling 
publics provide the authority and control of the resources necessary for the organization 
to exist, like shareholders and regulatory agencies. Two, functional publics give inputs to 
the organization and take outputs in return as they provide labor and utilize the 
organization’s service or products, like employees. In the event of a crisis, victims join 
the functional public, as they may have been customers prior to the crisis, however, when 
customers are harmed, they become victims too. Three, normative publics are those who 
share similar values or have similar problems, like trade unions. Four, diffused publics 
emerge when organizational activities result in external consequences, like the media, the 
community, and the public at large. Diffused publics are indirectly linked to an 
organization and include individuals and groups who are not formal members of an 
organization. Consequently, organizations-in-crisis seek to protect their image by 
modifying the publics’ perception of responsibility for the crisis or to manage 18 
 
 
impressions of the organization itself (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 1999). 
Although organizations attempt to manage the publics’ perception, the different publics 
already hold opinions regarding the organization and will continue to hold opinions 
regarding the organization after the termination of the crisis.  
 
MEDIA AS A KEY PUBLIC 
These models offer good insight into the dynamism of a crisis and offer some 
foundational strategies for dealing with a crisis. However, diffused publics, specifically 
the media, require more of an in depth look as they are most commonly misunderstood. 
Given that reality of a transforming media landscape, practitioners should seek out new 
communication channels and possibilities for engaging all stakeholders, especially the 
media (Morton, Tindall & Waters, 2010). 
Seeger (2006) posits that best practices of crisis communicators are grounded in 
effective communication with the media. ‘‘Rather than viewing the media as a liability in 
a crisis situation, risk and crisis communicators should engage the media, through open 
and honest communication, and use the media as a strategic resource to aid in managing 
the crisis’’ (Seeger, 2006, p. 241).  Additionally, a significant portion of communication 
with media is about “managing relationships where effectively managing organizational 
relationships around common interests and shared goals, over time, results in 
understanding and benefit for interacting organizations and publics” (Bruning & 
Ledingham, 2007, p. 190). To effectively manage this relationship between media and 
public relations practitioners, Bruning and Ledingham’s SMART model (as cited by 
Ledingham and Bruning, 2007) of public relations (Scan, Map, Act, Rollout and Track) 19 
 
 
provides guidelines for practitioners that engage in media relations and advances tools for 
auditing this relationship. Additionally, Ojeda & Veil (2010), suggest that media frames 
can influence how an individual understands or experiences a crisis. Media personnel 
assist with providing information to stakeholders in a crisis and prove the value of an 
organization-media relationship in a crisis situation.  
More importantly, if organizations fail to address a crisis effectively to key public 
like the media, they will seek alternative sources to fill the vacuum (Holladay, 2009). 
Additionally, research has suggested that journalists believe organizational spokespersons 
frequently obstruct rather than facilitate communication, creating mistrust in that 
organizational source and the preference of seeking out other sources like first responders 
(Holladay, 2009). Holladay also suggests that the “relative absence of statements from 
organizational representatives may be a function of journalists’ choices, rather than the 
lack of effort or skill by spokespersons [and] if this is the case, then traditional media 
may not be the most effective way to disseminate crisis-related information to the 
community” (Holladay, 2009, p. 216). 
In the last two decades, technological, economic, cultural and social changes have 
led to a diversified and media market (Falkheimer and Heide, 2009). As a result, both 
threats and opportunities for public relations arise through the growth of new and 
traditional media, globalization of media content and audience segregation problems. 
Subsequently, practitioners can adjust messages and get closer to micro-audiences with 
the increase in diversity and structural changes in media channels (Falkheimer and Heide, 
2009). Given the current media climate, people may now take an active information-
seeking role to choose their level and sources of information, in addition to journalists, 20 
 
 
rather than passively receiving news releases and media kits, journalist pitch their needs 
via social media (Malone & Stephens, 2009; Morton et al., 2010).    
The benefit of newer media provides opportunities for organizations, especially 
communicators, to develop more of a dialogic relationship between themselves and their 
stakeholders (Kent & Taylor, 1998).  However, newer media tools present some 
challenges. The idea of one spokesperson, as mentioned above, is one of those challenges 
as rapidly evolving technology  (e.g. internet sites, blogs, cellular phones with built in 
cameras and other personal networks) influence the communication process in ways that 
aren’t understood yet (Griffin, Lachlan, & Spence, 2007). Carey (2002) characterizes this 
phenomenon best by suggesting that “no single medium meets all of the informational, 
social, and emotional needs of citizens during a crisis’’ (p. 206). Furthermore, 
stakeholder publics now have the capability to create their own message strategies 
through new media outlets and find other sources of information and emotional support 
(Malone & Stephens, 2009).  
Malone and Stephens (2009) also suggest that scholars should examine the role of 
newer media in facilitating technical translations during a crisis and the types of social 
support that stakeholders may desire particularly with the availability of online crisis 
information and dialogic opportunities. According to the study conducted by Malone and 
Stephens (2009), if stakeholders aren’t provided with details from the organization, 
newer media outlets may be sought to seek technical explanations. The challenge of new 
media presents challenges for communicating technical information, it can be noted that 
newer media allow for individual stakeholders to virtually meet, share information, and 
potentially ban together to organize and seek damages from the organization in crisis 21 
 
 
(Malone & Stephens, 2009).  But it is also important to note that if people are seeking 
emotional support, technical messages are almost never included in messages as there is a 
separation between emotional and informational support and technical explanations, as 
they aren’t part of the sharing in loss (Malone & Stephens, 2009). A historical example is 
one of Three-Mile Island where reporters had to provide instructing information to 
residents in communities around the nuclear plant who were new to “science reporting” 
(news broadcasts and stories that are technical in nature) (Edison & Stephens, 1982). 
Additionally, it was found that media coverage was mostly reassuring and positive; 
however, reporting by the media was also restrained (Edison & Stephens, 1982).  
As a result of the current media landscape, the following can be prescribed for 
dealing with media during a crisis event: (1) organizations that are forthcoming with 
information, by being ready to respond when the media is ready to run a story, are less 
likely to be targeted by the media and public for wrongdoing; (2) the media can be used 
not only as an information resource but also a resource manager in the crisis response; (3) 
organizations should remain accessible to the media throughout the crisis response; (4) 
partnerships in which both parties should trust the other not to take advantage of the 
situation to allow for supportive environments; and (5) establishing relationships with the 
media before the crisis allows for ease of communication during the crisis (Coombs, 
2000).  
ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
In addition to understanding diffused publics, practitioners exploring crisis 
communications should look at the impact of crisis and crisis response strategies from a 
theoretical standpoint. Two theories that seek to address crisis response are attribution 22 
 
 
theory and neoinstitutionalism. Attribution theory is a useful framework for explaining 
the relationship between a situation and the selection of communication strategies and 
serves as the basis for crisis response-strategy selection guidelines by first defining the 
crisis and constructing the crisis management plan and then discussing factors that affect 
those crisis-response strategies (Coombs, 1995). There are three crisis types that can be 
applied to attribution theory as people attribute responsibility differently for each crisis 
type or cluster. Attributions of crisis responsibility by publics have been used to group 
the various crisis types into three clusters: (1) the victim cluster contains the crisis types 
that produces very low attributions of crisis responsibility and a mild reputational threat 
and typically includes natural disasters, rumors, product and tampering; (2) the accidental 
cluster produces minimal attributions of crisis responsibility as the organization can be 
seen as having a lack of volition and control and moderate reputational threat and 
includes challenges, technical-error accidents or product recalls; and (3) the intentional 
cluster are crisis types that produce strong attributions of crisis responsibility and have a 
severe reputational threat like human-error, product recalls, human-error accidents, and 
organizational misdeeds or management knowingly violating laws or regulations and/or 
knowingly placing stakeholders at risk (Coombs, 2004). 
Within the realm of attribution theory, Duncan, McAuley, and Russell (1992) 
identified four causal dimensions people might use when making attributions: stability 
(the assessment of the cause’s frequency of occurrence), external control (whether or not 
the event’s cause is controllable), personal control (whether or not the event’s cause is 
controllable by the organization or person), and locus (if the event’s cause is from the 
person or the situation). In addition, attributions of internal locus, controllability and 23 
 
 
stability create the perception that the organization is responsible for the crisis and that 
the organization could have done something to prevent the crisis. In contrast, the stronger 
the attributions of organizational responsibility, the more likely it is that the negative 
aspects of crisis will damage the organization and “when a crisis event is repeated 
(stable), publics are more likely to attribute responsibility to the organization” (Coombs 
& Holladay, 1996, p. 282). Additionally, there are four central factors that affect the 
attributions publics make about the crisis including: (1) crisis types, (2) accidents, (3) 
transgressions and (4) terrorism (Coombs, 1995). In addition, Coombs (1995) identified 
other factors that affect attributions that publics make including the veracity of evidence 
(true, false or ambiguous), damage and performance history. Ultimately, the attributions 
created by publics could lead to anger and a negative image of the organization, which 
sets the tone for future interactions. If “communication can alter publics' causal 
attributions or affect feelings generated by these attributions, crisis response strategies 
could be used to reduce reputational damage” (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p.283).  
 
CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
  Attribution theory creates a foundation for crisis response by understanding how 
publics view an organization during crisis, which in turn, creates a necessity for 
organizations to know how to respond to stakeholders. Situational Crisis Communication 
Theory (SCCT), which has some roots in attribution theory, helps to distinguish crisis 
response strategies from instructing information, which is another aspect of what an 
organization says or does after a crisis (Coombs, 2006). SCCT advances and test 
hypotheses related to how perceptions of the crisis situation affect the crisis response and 24 
 
 
the effects of crisis responses on outcomes such as reputation, emotions, and purchase 
intention (Coombs, 2007). Three factors in the crisis situation shape the reputational 
threat (see Appendix II): (1) initial crisis responsibility, (2) crisis history, and (3) 
relationship history/prior reputation. “SCCT holds that the potential reputational damage 
from a crisis is a function of crisis responsibility [how much stakeholders attribute the 
cause of the crisis to the organization] and of intensifying factors” (Coombs, 2006, p. 
243). Consequently, instructing information represents what stakeholders need and want 
to know after a crisis hits and there are three types of instructing information that can be 
provided: (1) crisis basics which is the basic information about what happened in the 
crisis event, (2) protection information to suggests what stakeholder can do to protect 
themselves and (3) correction information to tell the public of what will be done to 
remedy the situation (Coombs, 2006).  
 
Along with instructing information, although optional, crisis managers should use 
a basic crisis response strategy in a crisis situation. SCCT provides a crisis manager with 
three basic options for using crisis response strategies: (1) establish that no crisis exists, 
(2) alter the attributions about the crisis event to make it appear less negative to 
stakeholders, or (3) alter how stakeholders perceive the organization and to work to 
protect/repair the reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Deny response option seeks to 
prove no crisis exists or that the organization has no responsibility for the crisis. By 
disproving a crisis exists, the organization’s responsibility for the event serves to 
eliminate the reputational threat presented by a crisis (Coombs, 2006). Denial response 
strategies can include attacking the accuser by confronting the person or groups who 25 
 
 
claims wrong doing from the organization or denying that a crisis occurred and scapegoat 
by blaming outsiders to the organization for the crisis (Coombs, 2006). Diminishing 
response strategies include excuses (minimizing organizational responsibility by denying 
intent to do harm/claiming inability to control the leading events to the crisis as accidents 
happen as a part of operating organizations) and justification (minimizing the perceived 
damage caused by the crisis as minor) (Coombs, 2006). Lastly, the deal response strategy 
draws on crisis history in an effort to remind stakeholders of the organizations past 
efforts. Deal responses include concern (the express for concern for the victims), 
compassion (by offering money or other gifts to victims to compensate), regret 
(indicating that the organization feels bad about the crisis) and apology (the organization 
takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks for forgiveness) (Coombs, 2006).  
 
SCCT offers a number of approaches when dealing with crisis response, which is 
an integral part in dealing with crisis communication. When organizations experience 
crisis they are also concerned about their image and how their organization resonates 
with its stakeholders after the crisis especially if an image has been damaged. When 
dealing with attacks there are two components: (1) the accused is held responsible for an 
action or (2) the act is considered offensive and an organization must seek to restore its 
image and maintain its relationship with its stakeholders in order to survive (Benoit, 
1995). In addition to SCCT, neoinstitutionalism (legitimacy built by conforming to the 
social rules and expectations established by stakeholders) and attribution theory can be 
merged to form a symbolic approach to crisis management (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 
2001). The symbolic approach to crisis communication exceeds the basic lists of crisis 26 
 
 
response strategies to examine how the crisis situation can influence the selection and 
effectiveness of crisis response strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).   
The term symbolic is used because the emphasis is on how communication 
strategies (symbolic resources) are used in attempts to protect organizational images and 
to shape an organization's image while responding to a crisis (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 
2001; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs & Holladay, 1999). A tarnished image 
consists of redefining the attack, altering the nature of the accusations by refocusing the 
attention on other issues and lastly, considering that each accusation may not be 
important to the audience (Benoit, 1997). “In essence, image restoration and its variants 
attend to questions of reputational repair by articulating the range of assorted strategic 
messages likely to repair the image of the organization or individual under attack” (Ulma, 
Seeger & Sellnow, 2007, p. 130). Benoit (1995) synthesizes these typologies into a 
comprehensive model with five general options. 
Denial is the notion that a person accused of wrongdoing may simply deny that 
the act occurred or that, that individual committed it. This strategy is sometimes termed 
refusal and includes a shift in blame for the offensive act from self to another person 
(Benoit, 1995).  
Evading responsibility is a general image repair strategy that includes four tactics. 
An organization can engage in: (1) provocation by suggesting that they performed the act 
in question was a response to another prior wrongful act, understandably provoking the 
undesirable reaction; (2) defeasibility by pleading that there was a lack of information or 
control over events; (3) excuses based on the fact that accidents may reduce or absolve an 27 
 
 
actor of responsibility; and (4) the idea that people are sometimes willing to forgive a 
wrongful act if done with good intentions (Benoit, 1995).  
Reduce offensiveness of event is also a general image repair strategy but has six 
tactics.  A person who is accused of misbehavior may attempt to reduce the degree of ill 
feelings associated with the act by engaging in: (1) bolstering to mitigate the negative 
effects of the act on the actor by strengthening the audience's positive affect; (2) 
minimize the perceived offensiveness of the act in question; (3) differentiate a wrongful 
act from other less desirable, but similar actions; (4) employ transcendence, attempting to 
place the act in a larger, more desirable context; (5) attack one's accuser, suggesting that 
the victim deserved what happened to them, to lessen the impact of the attack; and (6) 
compensate through offers of positive reinforcements (cash, goods, services) to help 
offset the negative feeling associated with a wrongful act (Benoit, 1995).  
Corrective Action is the notion that those accused of wrongdoing may offer to 
take corrective action. The speaker may offer to repair existing damages and/or to take 
steps to prevent recurrence of the offensive act (Benoit & Drew, 1997).  
Mortification is the final image restoration strategy in which the accused may 
admit the wrongful act and ask for forgiveness ("concession" or "apology"). Mortification 
may include expressions of regret and request for forgiveness by its stakeholders (Benoit 
& Drew, 1997). Consequently, apologies are likely to be effective in dealing with 
problematic situations as people are often willing to forgive others when they admit to 
wrong doing and offer a sincere apology (Benoit & Drew, 1997). Researchers have over-
emphasized the use of apology/mortification as the “best” crisis response and have used 28 
 
 
widely varying definitions of apology (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2008).  
 
Similar to Benoit’s (1995) five stages of image restoration, Coombs (1995) 
created a similar five stage model that seeks to address image restoration strategies used 
in response to crises including: (1) nonexistence strategies that seek to eliminate the crisis 
by denying its existence, clarifying that no crisis exists, attaching a more aggressive 
strategy, or intimidating others who are less powerful by engaging in denial, attacks, and 
intimidation; (2) distance strategies that attempt to weaken the link between the crisis and 
the organization and by engaging in excuses, denial of volition and 
justification;(3)ingratiation strategies focus on ways to gain public approval such as 
bolstering, transcending and praising others; (4) mortification strategies that attempt to 
win forgiveness and create acceptance by remediation, repentance, and rectification; and 
lastly, (5) suffering strategy to portray the organization as the victim. There have been a 
number of models and a few theories developed in relation to crisis communication. 
Literature has shown that there is a need to understand how organizations and the public 
respond to crisis given the descriptive nature of these theories and models.  
 
CRISIS FOR THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
Exploring some of the regulatory factors that influence crisis communications for 
the nuclear industry can be beneficial for further comprehension on the research. It can be 
noted that within the realm of nuclear communications, emergency preparedness and 
crisis communications become terms that are exchanged, however, they both have two 29 
 
 
distinct differences. Since crisis communications theory has been explored in the review 
of literature, regulatory requirements in emergency also will be explored.  
Through the industry’s lessons learned from the Three Mile Island crisis, 
emergency preparedness seeks to have a comprehensive and coordinated response plan. 
Based on a variety of emergency situations, there are 4 classification levels of a nuclear 
emergency including: (1) a notification of an unusual event in which the event poses no 
threat to a person or to plant employees, but emergency officials are notified even though 
no action by the public is necessary; (2) an alert in which an event has occurred that 
could reduce the plant’s level of safety but backup plant systems are still operational, 
emergency agencies have been notified and kept informed and no action is necessary by 
the public; (3) a site area emergency that involves major problems with the plant’s safety 
systems that some radioactivity has possibly been release into the air or water but is not 
expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines 
(PAGs) beyond the site boundary and no public action is necessary; and (4) a general 
emergency, which is declared when an event at the plant has cause a loss of safety 
systems and radiation could be released that would travel beyond the site boundary. State 
and local authorities will take actions to protect residents living in communities near the 
plant. Most importantly, the alert and notification system will be sounded, people in the 
affected areas may be advised to evacuate or take shelter and listen to radio, television or 
tone alerts for specific information and instructions (Louisiana Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness, 2009). 
 Relative to communicating an emergency, licensees must notify responsible State 30 
 
 
and local government agencies within 15 minutes after declaring one of the four 
emergency action levels.  
Based on the historical contexts of nuclear power and its operation in the U.S., 
emergency preparedness is a priority and in some organizations, a culture. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Institute (2011), U.S. nuclear power plants are required by law to 
develop and test a comprehensive on-site and off-site emergency response plan that will 
be reviewed and approved by the state (in which the plant operates) and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Also, the NRC coordinates approval of the emergency 
plans with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Program (a leader in emergency planning beyond the nuclear 
plant site). Each plant must conduct a full-scale emergency exercise every two years that 
involves local and state government agencies at which these exercises are evaluated by 
the NRC (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2011). Additionally, FEMA’s Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Program evaluates the emergency plans of towns and cities near 
nuclear power plants. Given the highly regulatory and extensively detailed requirements 
of emergency planning, licensees, state and local agencies, State Emergency 
Management Agencies, State Departments of Health, county and municipal emergency 
management officials, the federal government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) all have delegated 
responsibilities that is attached to the large coordinated emergency plan (Miller Hastie, 
2002).  
 Emergency preparedness has become the coined term for the industry leaving the 
assumption that crisis communications may be merely a buzzword for practitioners. The 31 
 
 
most recent nuclear crisis overseas in Japan, at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power 
Station, has had significant implications for the nuclear industry since the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared the nuclear crisis a Level 6 (accident with wider 
consequences, one of that between Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) on the International 
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)(CNN, 2011). This tragic event further 
reinforces the need to understand crisis communications and media relations and the 
ability to communicate to publics through a variety of mediums.  
Reviewing literature within crisis communications and in some length, media 
relations theory, is not enough for understanding how it’s applied to the current practice 
of nuclear communication. The breadth of research explored through the review of 
literature creates some questions open for research regarding the nuclear industry and 
crisis communications, particularly the function of media relations in a crisis situation. 
Given the changing media landscape, the growth of access to information extended 
across geographical borders and the growth of interest in nuclear power, there is a need to 
understand the current practice of crisis communication and media relations to provide 
insight for the future. As the nuclear industry becomes more progressive, research needs 
to address these concerns for nuclear plant licensees who will face the challenges of 
advancing media and technology as well as complexities within crisis. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 




RQ1: What is the current practice of crisis communications and media 
relations in the nuclear industry? 
RQ2: How do practitioners in nuclear communications stay proactive in both crisis 
communications and media relations? 
RQ2a: Is the media receptive to proactive communication by practitioners in the nuclear 
industry? 
RQ2b: Can the media easily access information through the use of online 







Three research methods, each with a different focus, will be employed for 
addressing the research questions. The nuclear industry presents some challenges in 
obtaining information that may be proprietary in nature, therefore; the focus on my 
research will look more at the processes versus concrete information. This chapter will 
provide a discussion on the research methodologies chosen and will seek to best address 
each research question by obtaining both an internal and external perspective of nuclear 
communications through a triangulated method. Triangulation uses more than one 
research method to gather data to increase validity and reliability.  
RQ1: What is the current practice of crisis communications and media 
relations in the nuclear industry? 
RQ2: How do practitioners in nuclear communications stay proactive in both crisis 
communications and media relations? 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The method to best answer RQ1 and RQ2 is in-depth interviews, best used to 
answer questions of definition, value and policy will (Stacks, 2002). This method will 
best address these research questions given the nature of confidentiality within the 
nuclear industry for safety and security purposes. Since the interviewees are located 
across the United States, phone interviews are a feasible platform to obtain qualitative 34 
 
 
data.  Also, in-depth phone interviews will provide the opportunity for the interviewees to 
share information about their processes through open-ended questions relative to crisis 
communications and media relations.  
According to the Nuclear Energy Institute (2010), there are 104 nuclear reactors 
with 65 sites in the United States. Per a list compiled by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (2010), there are individual licensed owners to each power reactor and this 
population of 25 unique companies will be the sample for conducting interviews. This 
population was chosen to address the internal communication aspects of RQ1 and RQ2 
and to gain a variety of perspectives on the research topic.    
An initial invitation letter was sent to the Directors or Managers responsible for 
crisis communications/media relations for each company to begin the recruiting process. 
Follow-up phone calls were made two weeks after the invitation letters were sent to 
confirm participation in the research. Once participation in the research is confirmed, 
interviewees were a sent a copy of the interview script that included the interview 
questions and the informed consent for their records. Interviewees were given the chance 
to review the materials, based on the sensitivity of the topic, allowing that individual time 
to prepare for the interview or seek approval for commenting on the questions being 
asked.  
For each interview, participants were asked a series of eight questions. There are a 
variety of follow-up questions that were asked for clarity purposes and those questions 
were dependent on the answers given by the participant.  Each participant will be 
assigned a pseudonym of Company A, B, C and so on to ensure anonymity for their 35 
 
 
responses. The list of questions asked of the research participants can be found in 
Appendix III. 
 
RQ2a: Is the media receptive to proactive communication by practitioners in the 
nuclear industry? 
For RQ2a, which is a subsequent question of RQ2, a content analysis was 
conducted, but the focus of this content analysis was on media coverage of the sample 
during a constructed week. A content analysis can be defined as the systemic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics like in news releases or speeches 
(Neuendorf, 2002). Both quantitative and qualitative markers were used to evaluate the 
media coverage. The qualitative data was based on some of the quotes and frames 
explored through the media coverage, in addition to some other qualitative information 
like publication title. 
Coding Categories 
The coding categories were constructed to reflect meaningful aspects in nuclear 
communication like publication type, proximity, context, type of information, language 
used, etc. The purpose of the coding categories is to evaluate if information if being 
received by the media and to understand the context of the reporting. 
 
Coding Procedure 
The principal investigator used the list of owners/operators of nuclear reactors 
(and the associated nuclear reactors) as the sample. Media coverage was based on two 
constructed weeks, one in 2009 and one in 2010, which were chosen randomly. Articles 36 
 
 
were found using the LEXIS-NEXIS database of which search terms included the 
specified date from the constructed week, the names of the nuclear plants relative the 
licensed owner/operator and ‘all news (English).’ Missing or non-existent content was 
assigned a number greater than the assigned number values with the content analysis 
categories.  
 
  RQ2b: Can the media easily access information through the use of 
online communication in the newsrooms? 
The best way to answer RQ2b, which is a subsequent question of RQ2, was to use 
a content analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative markers were used in evaluating 
online newsrooms of licensed owners/operators of nuclear reactors as well as supporting 
nuclear energy organizations, agencies, societies and commissions. Newsroom evaluation 
was based on Kent and Taylor’s (1998) dialogic loop of online communication. Kent and 
Taylor suggest that a feedback loop is an appropriate starting point for dialogic 
communication between an organization and its publics allowing publics to query 
organizations and offer the organization an opportunity to respond (Kent & Taylor, 1998. 
p. 326). The list of supporting organizations was chosen from the Nuclear Energy 
Institute’s (2011) webpage of helpful links. The coders included comments on the coding 
sheets based on observations that were made when coding the websites.  
Coding Categories 
The coding categories for this research were modified based on the coding 
categories used in Callison’s (2003) Media relations and the Internet: how Fortune 500 37 
 
 
company websites assist journalists in news gathering. The sample coding sheet can be 
viewed in Appendix IV. 
Coding Procedure 
The principal investigator used the list of licensed owners/operators of nuclear 
plants as the sample. Since the content analysis focuses on manifest content (absence or 
presence), all 40 categories used quantitative coding to determine yes or no answers, the 
number of clicks to an aspect of the website and determined if the newsroom was a 
separate media site. Missing or non-existent content was assigned a number greater than 
the assigned number values with the content analysis categories.  
 
INTERCODER RELIABILITY 
Percent agreement was used to determine the rate of agreement for coding. Due to 
the small number of units being coded, the second coder completed 10% of the coding to 






Of the 25 identified licensed owners and operators of nuclear reactors, 13 agreed 
to participate in the in-depth interviews. Responses from the interviewees helped to 
provide insight for research questions one and two.  
RQ1: What is the current practice of crisis communications and media 
relations in the nuclear industry? 
Of the respondents, 13 (100%) communicated that nuclear communication is 
highly regulated and that their company follows specific requirements around emergency 
as prescribed by the NRC. Company A characterizes this approach by stating that “in the 
formal approach to nuclear communication, there won’t be a lot of variety as you will 
find across the industry an increasing  and consistent recognition of what’s spelt out in 
procedure.” Respondents also discussed informing officials and other state/local agencies 
in the practice of crisis communications and media relations.   
In addition to adhering to regulatory requirements, 13 (100%) mentioned that they 
use the formal process of an emergency plan in crisis communications. This includes 
setting up a Joint Information Center (JIC), communicating with state and public officials 
and reaching out to the media. Company A also stated that: 
   “[Nuclear communicators] have specific regulatory requirements around 
the nuclear plan with classifications of different events that happen around 
the plant that require an emergency response in the communications area.”  39 
 
 
Based on the emergency plan, all 13 (100%) respondents discussed the ability of 
the JIC serving as the place where state, county, and public officials, in addition to 
company personnel, can convene to communicate to a variety of publics.  Apart from the 
emergency plan, only five (38.5%) mentioned having a formal crisis communications and 
a media relations plan. Comparatively, all 13 (100%) respondents communicated their 
ability to inform all publics involved in a crisis based on their emergency plan.   
Drill and exercise are currently practiced and required as part of crisis 
communication planning and implementation.  Of the respondents, 13 (100%) 
communicated this as a central means for pre and post crisis planning and evaluation. 
Additionally, only four (31.8%) respondents discussed internal communication as 
primary tool for the success of crisis communications by communicating via email and 
intranet and using supervisory briefs or internal training to educate employees about 
programs. Only two (15.3%) respondents stated that they had a direct contact to 
leadership on an ongoing basis, accordingly, one of those respondents served on the 
leadership board to influence decision making in regards to communication.   
When it came to the practice of media relations, all 13 (100%) respondents 
discussed their ability to engage in relationships with local media. Comparatively, eight 
(61.5%) mentioned visiting with local media and weeklies to inform them about news 
regarding the nuclear plant. During a crisis, all 13 (100%) respondents voiced their 
strategy of using a spokesperson to handle media and engage in traditional media 
relations practices like setting up news conferences, sending out press releases, having 
staff available to answer media inquiries, and providing updates to media to maintain 
information flow. Only one respondent detailed their ability to “use the spokesperson as 40 
 
 
the designated person for approving all information and news releases that will go out to 
the media so that the turnaround for information to the media is quicker” (Company C). 
  All 13 (100%) respondents discussed using some form of online tools (like the 
web) to engage media. However, during a crisis, only one respondent discussed using PR 
Newswire as a backup system (as they have a distribution list that the company 
developed) should they not be able to get information out.  
When it comes to evaluation of crisis communications and media relations, 12 
(92.3%) discussed their ability to use media monitoring, keep track of news coverage or 
calls and ask for feedback to improve their communication efforts and nine (69.2%) 
mentioned using lessons learned and operational experiences to improve their 
communications. Also, two (15.3%) mentioned using third-party media monitoring 
services to evaluate their communications.  
 
 RQ2: How do practitioners in nuclear communications stay proactive in both 
crisis communications and media relations? 
Of the respondents, 13 (100%) communicated their ability to stay proactive with 
the media by putting out news releases and contacting the media with information. Three 
(23%) respondents specifically communicated that they pitch stories to only local 
newspapers and provide information, by request, to trade journals. Four (31.8%) 
specifically mentioned using drills (writing press releases, using mock media, setting up 
the JIC) to be proactive in crisis communications and media relations.  
Accordingly, 10 (77%) of respondents detailed community relations efforts (e.g. 
plant tours, community outreach through philanthropy, inviting media to events, serving 41 
 
 
on community boards and chambers) as a way of building goodwill prior to any crisis 
situation. One company discussed their company’s strategy of providing footage 
opportunities for media. “On an on-going basis we have media tours of the plant, where 
[the media] can shoot footage that serves as b-roll for when incidences do happen. We 
check what they shot and we provide b-roll that we’ve shot and have it cleared by 
security afterwards” (Company C). 
Only one respondent voiced that they are “more reactive than proactive” 
(Company H), in comparison to Company L, which expressed that they contact the media 
before notifications go out to the NRC page: “[our] strategy is make sure we tell our own 
story and make sure we tell it first because [the media] have several sources to go to, to 
get the story.”  
 
RQ2a: Is the media receptive to proactive communication by communication 
practitioners in the nuclear industry? 
Six hundred and thirty two news stories were coded for the 2 constructed weeks. 
Based upon the categories being explored, the quantitative results show that media is 
reporting on the nuclear industry, with 25% of coverage being local, 43.7% national and 
4.4% international.  However, 22% of coverage is trade publications to nuclear power 
(like Inside NRC, Platts and Nuclear News).  Other publications include newspapers 
(18.5%), newswires and press releases (15%), and other (like official documents) (9.5%). 
When it comes to reporting, media mention nuclear power through brief mention 
(37.8%), news articles or stories (26.3%), feature stories (3.2%) or notifications (2.7%).  42 
 
 
When it comes to the context of reporting of information, there are a variety of 
contents being covered. Most news context focuses on licensing, regulatory, financial, 
operational and general nuclear/energy news (see Figure 1).  Within that context, 27.1% 
of articled reported outcomes, results or statistics and 11.9% providing information on 
operation or licensing updates and 8.9%. The seconding highest statistic in information 
reported was company name or information in reference to another story.  
Regarding proactive communication, 37.7% of news coverage was after an event, 
compared to the 14.4% that was reported prior to an event. Only 4.4% was unknown 
relative to timeliness of information.  In reference to using spokespersons to 
communicate in the media, 63.6% of news coverage did not have a quote from leadership 
in the news. Comparatively, 5.4% of coverage use spokespersons didn’t have a job titles. 
For a complete list of frequencies, see Appendix V. Labels of “missing and non-existent,” 
were assigned to dates of the constructed week and the corresponding units when news 
articles were not retrieved through the LEXIS-NEXIS database. 
RQ2b: Can the media easily access information through the use of online 
communication in the newsrooms? 
Forty-two newsrooms of licensed owners/operators and nuclear energy 
organizations, agencies, societies and commissions were coded.  The quantitative results 
show that 90.5% of websites have a clear label indicating where media should go from 







News/Story Context  
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Community Outreach  9  1.4  1.4  1.4 
General Company 
News/Information 
27  4.3  4.3  5.7 
Emergency  8  1.3  1.3  7.0 
Issues Management  47  7.4  7.4  14.4 
Crisis  2  .3  .3  14.7 
Company 
Events/Activities 
8  1.3  1.3  16.0 
Licensing  84  13.3  13.3  29.3 
Regulatory  66  10.4  10.4  39.7 
Financial  68  10.8  10.8  50.5 
Operational  67  10.6  10.6  61.1 
General Nuclear/Energy 
News 
68  10.8  10.8  71.8 
Non-nuclear  8  1.3  1.3  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 




Only 4.8% of the websites didn’t have a newsroom. Comparatively, 78.8% of 
websites had the media page as part of a homepage whereas 16.7% made it a separate 
URL. Relative to company related information, 85.7% had a company mission statement 
(within two clicks of the newsroom), 71.4% had company history (within two clicks of 
the newsroom), 73.8% had a corporate profile (within 2 clicks of the newsroom) and 69% 
had executive bios/profiles (within 2 clicks of the media room).  
When it comes to identifying media and communications personnel, only 50% 
had a list of media and communications staff. Relative to contacting members of the 
media, 42.9% had direct contact (click on name to send email) capabilities, 45.2% posted 
the email addresses and telephone numbers of staff members and 50% had a clearly 
labeled hotline number to reach members of the media. 95.2% of websites did not have a 
connection to live chat.  
Relative to accessing media deliverables 71.4% of websites did not have a 
downloadable media kit; accordingly, 47.6% had fact sheets available. However, 88.1% 
did have press releases available and 83.3% had news releases archived.  Figures 1 and 2 
portray the characteristics of press release organization on the website.  
  Accordingly, only 47.6% of websites allowed media to register 
with the company to receive news. Of the coded websites, 90.5% did not 
have a help button available, 92.9% did not have frequently asked 
questions (FAQs), aimed at the media or suggestions to come back to the 
site. However, 64.3% of websites did have links to social media. For a 





Press/News Release Search Engine 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  15  35.7  35.7  35.7 
No  25  59.5  59.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 




Placement of Contact Information in Press/News Release 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  28  66.7  66.7  66.7 
No  12  28.6  28.6  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 







Based on the findings, crisis communications and media relations for the industry 
is, to an extent, practiced consistently across the industry due to highly regulated 
influences and the variety of stakeholders involved in the business. Nuclear 
communicators engage in two-way communication with the media by sending out press 
releases, maintaining relationships with local media, updating information on the website 
and hosting plant tours, for example, on an on-going process.  
 
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND CRISIS 
Crisis communications efforts seemed to be dictated by the emergency procedures 
the company outlined and few respondents clearly stated that they had crisis 
communications and media relations plans outside of the communication procedures 
relative to an emergency. Emergency procedures are effective and contain language that 
is understood among professionals within the industry, not only communicators. Also, 
they are effective at bringing local, state and public officials to a Joint Information Center 
for productive external communications.  
Although the emergency plans are very thorough and connect nuclear 
communicators and leadership to stakeholders and other publics, there should still be a 
crisis communication plan that addresses dealing with the media and international 
publics, online communication through the website and social media and providing 47 
 
 
information to local and national organizations. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provide their assistance in communicating 
across a national and international platform, but the company must still be able to remain 
visible through all these experts and officials.  
More importantly, these crisis communication plans need to address the 
difference between emergency communication and crisis communication. It can be noted 
that with regard to crisis communications, there is meshing between the terms crisis and 
emergency. Company B characterizes this best by saying: 
 “Several different terms are used interchangeably, which are not 
interchangeable terms.  One of which is crisis and the other, emergency.  
What is described by NEI is formal for an emergency but doesn’t begin to 
touch on the scope of a true crisis.”  
 
Communication practitioners in the nuclear industry should consider defining 
what crisis means from a communicative standpoint. An emergency can be an emergency 
from an operational and daily flow of activities standpoint, however, in regards to 
communication, an issue can become a crisis, for example, “based on the inability to 
control messages to the media or the public given the new media and technological 
landscape” Company C. Additionally, media relations plans need to consider the changes 
in media communication and address those changes through effective measures. Nuclear 
communicators shouldn’t rely on research conducted by bigger organizations to 
understand the preferences of local media. Since respondents mainly pitch to local media, 
they need to understand how journalistic practices function within that community and 




MEDIA RELATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Relative to communicating with media, few respondents discussed relationship 
building with national media. However during a crisis, national media will still inquire 
about the event. Not extending efforts to national media can be detrimental during a crisis 
because national media outlets are most sought after by the public at large and abroad. 
This suggests that should a crisis occur, nuclear communicators will not have allies on a 
national platform and there will be a significant knowledge gap when it comes to 
reporting. Accordingly, respondents didn’t outline their efforts to educate media about 
the processes of nuclear power. Informing media about events at the various nuclear 
plants was a common theme relative to communication efforts, however, with the 
challenge of not having a beat reporter anymore as expressed by a few companies, there 
is still the potential for increase in the knowledge gap when it comes to reporting on 
highly technical processes.  
A step forward for crisis communications and media relations in the nuclear 
industry would be evaluating the process of getting information to publics during an 
event to ensure that media and publics seek the company out as the primary source for 
information. Since there are a number of organizations that support nuclear energy that 
will add their expert opinion during an emergency or crisis situation, nuclear 
communicators should consider those opinions as supplement to what the company is 
saying, versus having their opinion be supplemental to what the organizations say. 
Nuclear communicators may consider using the supporting organizations’ websites as a 
tool for communicating to publics as media and other stakeholders will look to those 
organizations as they may deem them the experts in a crisis situation.  49 
 
 
The Use of Social Media 
Interviewees recognized social media as the game changer for how practitioners 
communicate with publics. Maybe prior to a crisis (during the pre-crisis stage), social 
media can be used to engage followers in dialogic communication about nuclear power 
that includes educational components to attempt to match the conversation with the 
public. This may prove useful during a crisis situation as the company’s social media 
presence would have already been recognized, versus, participating in social media to 
begin facilitating conversation and attempting to influence perception and opinions 
online. Understanding how journalists use social media speaks to the need for nuclear 
companies to conduct research on how their local media partners use social media and 
begin to build an online relationship with those individuals as well as maintain their 
current face-to-face interactions.  
Adding Value to Drill and Exercise 
Drill and exercise, a required practice as part of regulatory provisions, are 
effective means of evaluations. Those companies that expressed rotating positions for 
equal training and understanding during an emergency event can measure its affectivity. 
Companies that expressed their ability to use mock media and community members, like 
university journalism students, to participate in drill exercises also see the benefits of 
obtaining new perspective for feedback purposes. To go beyond the scope of an 
emergency, companies should consider the elements of a true crisis and add 
unpredictable “turn of events” to their drills. Attached to these unpredictable elements 
that get added into the scenario without prior knowledge, communicators should practice 50 
 
 
employing messages through both traditional and new media channels, in addition to 
working with supporting organizations, to get materials on their websites.   
When it comes to proactive crisis communications and media relations there is 
consistency across the industry in terms of the actions taken to be upfront with the media. 
A large portion of respondents voiced that they build relationships with local media and 
pitch their news stories or information specifically to those local outlets. The content 
analysis of news coverage over a constructed two-week period confirmed this theme. 
Most of the newspaper coverage was from local media outlets. This suggests that local 
media are receiving and reporting the information that the nuclear companies send to 
them. Comparatively, trade publications were the largest reports of nuclear news stories. 
Most respondents did identify trade publications as media sources that would cover the 
plant, however, they also noted that they wouldn’t pitch to trade publication as trade 
publication usually sought information from the company. This finding suggests that 
most news stories and information are still being kept within the nuclear industry through 
trade publications. Only local newspapers pick up news stories and that media generally 
shares information with other sources around that nuclear plant community or in nearby 
vicinities. This also suggests that Americans are still not educated and informed about the 
activities of the nuclear industry and that may lead to uncertainty, panic and fear on a 
national scale during a crisis situation.   
Subsequently, qualitative observations of the media coverage show that Three 
Mile Island is still being used a referent in news stories and still continues to shape some 
of the coverage and they in which information is presented to the public. Interviewees 
expressed the necessity of having a spokesperson that communicates with the media and 51 
 
 
publics; however, there were a significant amount of new stories that didn’t have a quote 
or commentary from leadership. Additionally, when there was a quote mentioned, the 
person did not have a title by their name. The spokesperson’s name may resonate with the 
local community and officials, however, that name does not resonate with individuals and 
members of the media on a national level. Interestingly, there were significant quotes and 
commentary from the NRC reported in the news coverage. This suggests that media are 
going to contact supporting organizations, like the NRC, and use them as experts in 
sharing information. One interviewee recognized this trend by mentioning: 
 “If [nuclear communicators] don’t talk to [the media] about a local issue 
they will go right to the NRC. There is no such thing as deadlines anymore 
because the media want to post things on their websites before details are 
flushed out by the company” (Company L).  
 
Nuclear communicators should consider evaluating how to get involved in the 
NRC’s media relations process so that the company serves as a source for when the NRC 
sends out new releases or notifications for events like town forums on relicensing. 
 
THE USE OF ONLINE NEWSROOMS 
When it comes to using the online newsroom to be a source of information, 
nuclear power companies do a good job of providing information and materials to the 
media. When it come to ease of navigation through the websites, it has been observed 
that not all of the websites are user friendly and all nuclear power companies should 
consider this usability when communicating to the media. Since a large number of 
nuclear power plants have parent companies, of which they call corporate, newsrooms 
can be hard to navigate when both newsrooms are linked together. Most newsrooms 52 
 
 
contained both utility and nuclear news making it hard to point out news stories that 
focused on the nuclear aspects of the company. When analyzing the media coverage and 
then cross checking that coverage with stories posted on the website, a majority of the 
websites had one or two related press releases posted that aligned with the constructed 
week. To be most effective, nuclear communicators should evaluate whether utility and 
nuclear news stories should be separated and archived but posted in the same newsroom 
for clear and easy access to information.   
For media, accessing the company’s media personnel should be the easiest task. 
However, it was observed that in some newsrooms not all the contact information (e.g. 
staff member names, titles, phone numbers, email addresses) is listed. For example, in 
one newsroom, the coder had to click  ‘contact us’ to get to media contact information. 
Comparatively, in another newsroom, the coder had to navigate to the parent company’s 
website to get information regarding anything related to communications. If interviewees 
communicated that they are aware that media have deadlines and will seek out sources 
for information, then nuclear communicators must be sensitive to that fact by sharing 
contact information openly and clearly on the web. Also, interviewees communicated that 
they are constantly maintaining relationships with members of the media. This 
relationship should also be maintained online. Most newsrooms did not have a suggestion 
to come back to the website and only one newsroom had a feedback form to maintain this 
online dialogic communication with the media.  
For the supporting organizations of nuclear energy, it’s consistent across the 
board that there isn’t a formal newsroom for media to go. Press releases and other 
information are generally posted under tabs. This can be a challenge when 53 
 
 
communicating during a crisis. If these supporting organizations offer expert opinions 
during a crisis and provide insight to the media, then publics and other media sources will 
visit those websites to seek out information. If supporting organizations do not have user-
friendly websites and a clearly labeled newsroom, it may pose a problem for companies 
attempting to engage in issues management or control messages and information flow 
during a crisis. This user friendly website capabilities extends to international support 
organizations as well, as a crisis in the nuclear industry is experienced on a global scale. 
The direction of online communication can be characterized as such:  
“The public views the veracity of news differently than they have in the 
past. There is a fundamental change when we talk about news media 
because we have to go straight to the public to answer their concerns and 
question” (Company J).  
 
In addition to that, nuclear communicators have to be able to educate the media prior to 
the crisis and seek the out to address their concerns during and after a crisis. 
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR NUCLEAR COMMUNICATION 
  Based upon the research, it can be noted that practitioners use the theoretical 
models of crisis communications in their practice of nuclear communications. 
Specifically, from the findings within the interviews, practitioners engage in the basics of 
the three stage model of crisis communications: (1) pre-crisis (e.g. through media 
monitoring, community outreach); (2) crisis response (e.g. through proactive drill and 
exercise, emergency planning and communication); and (3) post-crisis (e.g. evaluating 
drill and exercise, discuss lessons learned, improve practices).  54 
 
 
  Given the variety of models that incorporate variations of the pre-crisis to post-
crisis process, the study suggests that practitioners engage heavily in the beginning stages 
of crisis communications to prevent crisis from occurring, however, practitioners also 
engage in the steps that precede crisis planning to evaluate the process of a crisis scenario 
based on emergency procedure. Given the technical and procedurally regulated nature of 
the nuclear industry, Mitroff and Pearson’s (1993), five-stage model speaks to the idea of 
evaluation and using lessons learned within the industry to support crisis 
planning/prevention initiatives. Also, with the undefined boundaries of crisis 
management and emergency management, the five-dimension model, is one model, that 
is applicable to both areas and relative to how practitioners communicated their current 
implementation of both emergency/crisis communications activities.  
  When it comes to theory and practice, it can also be noted that Three Mile Island 
is still a referent for a variety of publics, including the media, when they are reporting. In 
regards to attribution theory and the theoretical framework, crisis responsibility for the 
nuclear industry will be stronger given the weight of the industry’s performance history 
(e.g. crisis history--Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and currently, Fukushima Dai-Ichi and 
relationship history).   
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Nuclear communicators can use this research to further evaluate their current 
practice of crisis communications and media relations within the nuclear industry. If a 
company doesn’t have a crisis communications or a media relations plan, outside of their 55 
 
 
emergency procedures, that speaks to the current media and technological landscape, then 
the company puts itself at risk for ineffective communications during a crisis event. 
Public relations practitioners within the nuclear industry should use this research 
to assess their current media relations practices and consider analyzing local media to 
employ a strategic media relations approach specific to their community and to national 
media. 
Lastly, practitioners can assess their online dialogic communication with the 
media via their newsrooms for effective online relationship management. Providing clear 
and accessible information to media and other publics are detrimental to communication 
prior to a crisis, during a crisis and after a crisis.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research was conducted right before the untimely and tragic nuclear event in 
Japan at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Station. The significance of this nuclear 
event has had implications for nuclear power plants around the world and has 
dramatically shaped the opinions of publics on a global scale. Should this research have 
been completed once the crisis occurred or after the resolution of the crisis event, the 
opinions from interviewees and data (both quantitative and qualitative) collected would 
be significantly different from the results reported.  
This suggests that future research should look at the impact of the Fukushima 
Dai-Ichi Nuclear crisis on crisis communication and media relations for the industry. 
Also, research should examine the online dialogic communication with media and publics 56 
 
 
(e.g. how social media impacted crisis communications or how the media used social 
media in their reporting). Research should also use this study as a comparative analysis to 
examine how crisis communications and media relations have changed in the U.S. 
because of the nuclear crisis in Japan.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This research is important because it provided insight for practitioners on how 
crisis communications and media relations are currently practiced in a highly regulated 
environment. This research also communicates a need for practitioners to place crisis 
communications on the decision-making and planning agenda, especially for the nuclear 
industry. Also, this research was instrumental in revealing the ways in which practitioners 
currently use media relations strategies and provides direction for moving forward. 
The goal of this study was to explore crisis communications and media relations 
in the nuclear industry. Also, the goal was to explore practitioners’ current use of 
proactive communications with publics, like the media. As the media landscape continues 
to transform, professionals within the nuclear field should be aware of the opportunities 
and threats that influence their crisis communication and media relations strategies. 
The challenges that practitioners in nuclear communication face are constant 
criticism from publics that is uneducated about nuclear power. The greatest opportunity 
from this challenge would be to educate publics about nuclear power for preparation that 
will be invaluable during a crisis. Also, companies without a budget or staff to conduct 57 
 
 
ongoing research cannot always engage in assessment activities that can influence 
decision-making and the strategic planning process. 
Communicators in the nuclear industry should consider how they define crisis 
communications for their organization and engage in internal communication to 
employees to share in this meaning. Now that there are common communication 
practices that have been revealed, practitioners should assess their processes and 
strategies and make changes that address the both crisis communication and general 
communication efforts in a new media landscape and through online dialogic 
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Appendix III: Sample Interview Questions 
 
1.  Can you tell me what your company does beyond the basic communication 
requirements outlined by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) for the 4 levels of 
an emergency? 
 
2.  What would you say are common industry practices for nuclear 
communication? What do you do beyond these common practices? 
 
3.  How does your company stay proactive in the communication process? 
a.  Relative to crisis communications? 
b.Relative to media relations? 
 
4.  Are there specific differences in the media relations process specific to 
nuclear power plants? 
a.  Can you tell me how your media relations process works? 
b.How is this process different during a crisis? 
 
5.  Can you tell me what publications/local or national news media you pitch to?  
 
6.  Can you tell me about the communication structure of your company? 
a.  How is this structure different during a crisis? 
 
7.  How do you evaluate your communication efforts? 
a.  Tell me about your evaluation methods during a crisis? 
i.  In regards to media? 








Appendix IV: Sample Code Sheet for Online Newsrooms 
Media Relations in Nuclear Industry 
 
1.  Company/Organization/Institution Name: ___________________________________ 
2.  List: _________________________________________________ 
3.  Label indicating where media should go from main site? _______________________ 
4.  Number of clicks to get to the media room (actual number): ____________________ 
5.  Media page part of home page or separate URL? __________________________ 
6.  Link on media page to investor page? ___________________________________ 
7.  Separate page for financial/investor relations? __________________________ 
8.  Welcome message? ____________________________ 
9.  Indication of updates? _____________________________ 
10. Company mission statement (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? ____________________ 
11. Company history (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _____________________________ 
12. Corporate profile (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? __________________________ 
13. Executive bios/profiles (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? ________________________ 
14. Executive photographs (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _______________________ 
15. List of media/communications staff? ____________________________ 
16. Direct contact (click on name to send email)? ____________________________ 
17. E-mail address (of staff members)? ______________________________ 
18. Office telephone number of staff members? ___________________________ 
19. Hotline number for members of the media? ___________________________ 
20. Physical mailing address? ___________________ 
21. Connection through live chat? ______________________________ 
22. Company fact sheets? ________________________ 
23. Downloadable media kit (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _______________________ 
24. Press/news releases? ________________________ 
25. Press/news releases archived? _______________________ 
26. Press/news release search engine? ______________________________ 
27. Placement of contact information in press/news releases? _____________________ 
28. News published or aired about company? ______________________ 
29. Material presented in real-time audio (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _____________ 
30. Company staff speeches/presentations? _____________________ 
31. Company logos/pictures in downloadable format? ______________________ 
32. Company philanthropic activity (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _________________ 
33. News alert service for media (RSS Feeds)? _____________________ 
34. Opportunity for press personnel to register with company? ____________________ 
35. Help button available in media room? _________________________ 
36. FAQ aimed at media? ________________________ 
37. Editorial stories written by company staff (within 2 clicks of newsroom)? _________ 
38. Links to social media? _____________________ 
39. Sitemap available in media room? _________________________ 




Appendix V: Nuclear Plant Media Coverage Content Analysis 
 
Date 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Monday 09/14/09  58  9.2  9.2  9.2 
Tuesday 10/6/09  39  6.2  6.2  15.3 
Wednesday 07/01/09  76  12.0  12.0  27.4 
Thursday 01/15/09  38  6.0  6.0  33.4 
Friday 07/31/09  32  5.1  5.1  38.4 
Saturday 09/26/09  29  4.6  4.6  43.0 
Sunday 02/15/09  26  4.1  4.1  47.2 
Monday 02/01/10  84  13.3  13.3  60.4 
Tuesday 03/23/10  39  6.2  6.2  66.6 
Wednesday 06/02/10  36  5.7  5.7  72.3 
Thursday 04/08/10  76  12.0  12.0  84.3 
Friday 03/05/10  42  6.6  6.6  91.0 
Saturday 08/07/10  31  4.9  4.9  95.9 
Sunday 12/12/10  26  4.1  4.1  100.0 
Valid 






   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Local  158  25.0  25.0  25.0 
National  276  43.7  43.7  68.7 
International  28  4.4  4.4  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 
Total  632  100.0  100.0   
 
 
News or Story Reference 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Nuclear  372  58.9  58.9  58.9 
Utilities  20  3.2  3.2  62.0 
Both  51  8.1  8.1  70.1 
None  19  3.0  3.0  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 





Type of Publication 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Newspaper  117  18.5  18.5  18.5 
Trade  140  22.2  22.2  40.7 
Magazine and Journal  15  2.4  2.4  43.0 
Newswire and Press Release  95  15.0  15.0  58.1 
Online Web Publication  31  4.9  4.9  63.0 
Congressional Testimony  1  .2  .2  63.1 
Transcript  3  .5  .5  63.6 
Other  60  9.5  9.5  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 











Scope of Mention 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Brief Mention  239  37.8  37.8  37.8 
News Article or Story  166  26.3  26.3  64.1 
Feature Story  20  3.2  3.2  67.2 
Opinion Piece  4  .6  .6  67.9 
Editorial  6  .9  .9  68.8 
Letter  2  .3  .3  69.1 
News Transcript  2  .3  .3  69.5 
Notification  17  2.7  2.7  72.2 
Document  6  .9  .9  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 










Favorableness of Coverage 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive  55  8.7  8.7  8.7 
Negative  62  9.8  9.8  18.5 
Neutral  308  48.7  48.7  67.2 
Mixed  37  5.9  5.9  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 
















News/Story Context  
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Community Outreach  9  1.4  1.4  1.4 
General Company 
News/Information 
27  4.3  4.3  5.7 
Emergency  8  1.3  1.3  7.0 
Issues Management  47  7.4  7.4  14.4 
Crisis  2  .3  .3  14.7 
Company Events/Activities  8  1.3  1.3  16.0 
Licensing  84  13.3  13.3  29.3 
Regulatory  66  10.4  10.4  39.7 
Financial  68  10.8  10.8  50.5 
Operational  67  10.6  10.6  61.1 
General Nuclear/Energy 
News 
68  10.8  10.8  71.8 
Non-nuclear  8  1.3  1.3  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 






Type of Information Reported 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Instructing Information  4  .6  .6  .6 
Community Updates  56  8.9  8.9  9.5 
Reporting 
Results/Statistics/Outcomes 
171  27.1  27.1  36.6 
Invitation to events/activities  32  5.1  5.1  41.6 
Company Name or 
Information in Reference to 
Another Story 
125  19.8  19.8  61.4 
Operation or Licensing 
Update 
74  11.7  11.7  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 










Timeliness of Information 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Prior to an Event  91  14.4  14.4  14.4 
During an Event  105  16.6  16.6  31.0 
After an Event  238  37.7  37.7  68.7 
Unknown  28  4.4  4.4  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 
Total  632  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Presence of Contact Information 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Name and Phone Number  3  .5  .5  .5 
Name, Phone Number and 
Website 
3  .5  .5  .9 
None  456  72.2  72.2  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 






Type of Language Used  
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Common  250  39.6  39.6  39.6 
Technical  21  3.3  3.3  42.9 
Common with Few Technical 
Terms 
124  19.6  19.6  62.5 
Technical with Explanations 
and Definitions 
28  4.4  4.4  66.9 
Technical with Few 
Explanations and Definitions 
39  6.2  6.2  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 













Quotes from Leadership 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Chief Operating Officer  3  .5  .5  .5 
Chief Executive Officer  8  1.3  1.3  1.7 
Director/Manager of 
Communications 
3  .5  .5  2.2 
None  402  63.6  63.6  65.8 
Spokesman without a Job 
Title 
34  5.4  5.4  71.2 
Other Management/Executive 
Personnel 
12  1.9  1.9  73.1 
Missing or Non-existent  170  26.9  26.9  100.0 
Valid 













Appendix VI: Online Newsrooms Content Analysis Frequencies 
	 ﾠ
Label Indicating Where Media Go from Main Site 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  38  90.5  90.5  90.5 
No  2  4.8  4.8  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Number of Clicks to Media Room (actual number) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1  38  90.5  90.5  90.5 
2  2  4.8  4.8  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 







Media Page  Part of Homepage or Separate URL 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Part of Homepage  33  78.6  78.6  78.6 
Separate URL  7  16.7  16.7  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Link on Media Page to Investor Page 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  18  42.9  42.9  42.9 
No  7  16.7  16.7  59.5 
Missing or Non-existent  17  40.5  40.5  100.0 
Valid 









Separate page for Financial/Investor Relations 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  18  42.9  42.9  42.9 
No  7  16.7  16.7  59.5 
Missing or Non-existent  17  40.5  40.5  100.0 
Valid 




   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  15  35.7  35.7  35.7 
No  25  59.5  59.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









Indication of Updates 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  33  78.6  78.6  78.6 
No  7  16.7  16.7  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Company Mission Statement (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  36  85.7  85.7  85.7 
No  4  9.5  9.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 










Company History (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  30  71.4  71.4  71.4 
No  10  23.8  23.8  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Corporate Profile (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  31  73.8  73.8  73.8 
No  9  21.4  21.4  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









Executive Bios/Profiles (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  29  69.0  69.0  69.0 
No  11  26.2  26.2  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Executive Photographs (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  28  66.7  66.7  66.7 
No  12  28.6  28.6  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 








List of Media/Communications Staff 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  21  50.0  50.0  50.0 
No  19  45.2  45.2  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Direct Contact (click of name to send email) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  18  42.9  42.9  42.9 
No  22  52.4  52.4  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 










Email Address of Staff Members 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  19  45.2  45.2  45.2 
No  21  50.0  50.0  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Office Telephone Number of Staff Members 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  19  45.2  45.2  45.2 
No  21  50.0  50.0  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









Hotline Number for Members of the Media 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  21  50.0  50.0  50.0 
No  19  45.2  45.2  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Physical Mailing Address 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  23  54.8  54.8  54.8 
No  17  40.5  40.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









Connection through Live Chat 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
No  40  95.2  95.2  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Company Fact Sheets 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  20  47.6  47.6  47.6 
No  20  47.6  47.6  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 










Downloadable Media Kits 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  10  23.8  23.8  23.8 
No  30  71.4  71.4  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 




   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  37  88.1  88.1  88.1 
No  3  7.1  7.1  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 








Press/News Release Archived 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  35  83.3  83.3  83.3 
No  5  11.9  11.9  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Press/News Release Search Engine 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  15  35.7  35.7  35.7 
No  25  59.5  59.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









Placement of Contact Information in Press/News Release 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  28  66.7  66.7  66.7 
No  12  28.6  28.6  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
News Published/Aired about Company 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  22  52.4  52.4  52.4 
No  18  42.9  42.9  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 










Material Presented in Real-Time Audio (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  25  59.5  59.5  59.5 
No  15  35.7  35.7  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Company Staff Speeches/Presentations 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  27  64.3  64.3  64.3 
No  13  31.0  31.0  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   







Company Logos/Pictures in Downloadable Format 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  24  57.1  57.1  57.1 
No  16  38.1  38.1  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Company Philanthropic  Activity (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  24  57.1  57.1  57.1 
No  16  38.1  38.1  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 









News Alert Service for Media (i.e .RSS Feeds) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  20  47.6  47.6  47.6 
No  20  47.6  47.6  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Opportunity for Press Personnel to Register with Company 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  16  38.1  38.1  38.1 
No  24  57.1  57.1  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 










Help Button Available in Media Room 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  2  4.8  4.8  4.8 
No  38  90.5  90.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
FAQ Aimed at Media 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  1  2.4  2.4  2.4 
No  39  92.9  92.9  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 








Editorial Stories Written by Staff (within 2 clicks) 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  2  4.8  4.8  4.8 
No  38  90.5  90.5  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Links to Social Media 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  27  64.3  64.3  64.3 
No  13  31.0  31.0  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 











Sitemap Available in Media Room 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  22  52.4  52.4  52.4 
No  18  42.9  42.9  95.2 
Missing or Non-existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   
 
 
Suggestion to Come Back to Site 
   
Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  1  2.4  2.4  2.4 
No  39  92.9  92.9  95.2 
Missing or Existent  2  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Valid 
Total  42  100.0  100.0   100 
 
 
 